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INTRODUCTION
We, as humans, are social beings who through our interactions in the world demonstrate a
compulsion to attribute the richness of our own internal mental lives to others. As professor of
psychology and neuroscience Michael Graziano puts it, “when [we] talk to someone, [we] have an
automatic impression of thoughts, emotions and awareness emanating from that person”
(Graziano, 1). This automatic impression allows us to reasonably theorize about the other’s
thoughts, beliefs and feelings as mental states, and grasp the underlying motivations of their
behaviors in our interactions with them (Byom and Mutlu, 2013). In philosophical discourse, the
issue of whether we attribute mental states or minds to others is generally referred to as Theory of
Mind (TOM) (Byom and Mutlu, 2013). Further, TOM also encompasses the issue of how we
attribute mental states or minds to others (Byom and Mutlu, 2013).
When addressing those issues encompassed in TOM there are two possible explanations.
One possibility is that we all have a formed universal folk psychological theory of how the mind
works, which informs the way in which we attribute mental states to others. According to this
possibility, we all construct a general model of the mind, as to infer from a token behavior the
mental state [of the other]” (Deonna and Nanay, 2014). This assumes that a particular expression
or behavior of the other equates to a mental state of our own with which we are already familiar,
based on the general model, and is known as the theory theory (Deonna and Nanay, 2014). Another
possibility is that we all have the capacity to simulate and project our own mental states onto
others. That is, that we all run a simulation of our thoughts, beliefs and feelings given a set of
circumstances, and project them onto others (Deonna and Nanay, 2014). Colloquially put, we are
able to put ourselves in the other’s shoes. This is the simulation theory, and it assumes that our
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imagination is accurate in simulating, predicting and projecting our own mental states onto others
(Deonna and Nanay, 2014).
Both the theory theory and the simulation theory are generally accepted as longstanding
separate models of TOM. More recently, however, they are no longer treated as conflicting views;
instead, they are treated as “different means at our disposal to make sense of others as
psychological beings” (Deonna and Nanay, 2014). Making sense of others as psychological beings
requires a consideration of who the proper subjects of investigation are, when asking who or what
belongs to the category of psychological beings. Psychological beings are those to whom we
attribute mental states. Thus, it is evident that other humans, to whom we consistently attribute
mental states, either through the theory theory or the simulation theory, are psychological beings.
However, it seems a number of nonhuman animals (hereafter: animals) should not be overlooked
when asking who or what are psychological beings (Vitti, 2010). Indeed, many of us extend our
desire to attribute our rich internal mental life to others to a number of animals. That is, similar to
how Graziano describes human-human interactions, in human-animal interactions we also seem
to have an impression of thoughts, emotions and awareness emanating from animals.
The tendency to attribute mental states to animals, along with the impression of a rich
internal life in animals, motivates several questions central to the literature on animal cognition:
1. Do animals have mental states or minds?
2. Are animals conscious?
a. If not all, are some animals conscious? (Which can also be formulated as:
what is the distribution of consciousness across the animal kingdom?)
3. What is animal consciousness like?
Each of these questions asks whether the impression of mental states in animals is an impression
of something that exists independently of us, or, alternatively, if it is a mere appearance resulting
from how we understand our own minds. Furthermore, those questions specifically concerning
consciousness, are both deeply scientific and philosophical in nature, and demand that theories of
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consciousness provide a means of distinguishing between animals which are and are not conscious
(Andrews, 52).
In the literature on animal cognition, the phenomenon of consciousness is commonly
described “in terms of qualia – how things feel – awareness” (Andrews, 52). The term ‘qualia’ is
derived from the Latin ‘quālis,’ meaning “of what kind,” and thereby makes reference to the
subjective qualities or aspects of mental states (Mandik, 3). However, consciousness by its own
nature is rather complex; it is understood in a variety of ways by different philosophers, and as
such suffers from muddled connotations (Cartmill, 2000). The most prominent and oft-recognized
definition of animal consciousness stems from Thomas Nagel’s writing, which focuses on the
question of “what it is like” to be animal X (Nagel, 1974). Nagel argues “an organism or process
can be said to be conscious if there is something that it is like to be that organism or to be
undergoing that process; [and so what is] essential to consciousness is its phenomenal, experiential,
or qualitative feel” (Vitti, 2010). Here, Nagel focuses purely on consciousness in the phenomenal
sense, which is unsurprisingly termed ‘phenomenal consciousness,’ and thought to encompass “the
qualitative nature of experience” (Andrews, 52).
Phenomenal consciousness, however, does not encompass the phenomenon of selfconsciousness. Indeed, self-consciousness differs from phenomenal consciousness in an important
way, as demonstrated by Kristen Andrews in the following passage:
This distinction [between phenomenal consciousness and self-consciousness] is
important because it may be that one can have conscious experience without being
self-conscious of that experience – individuals may experience pain without
reflecting on the pain experience. (Andrews, 52)
Here, how self-consciousness is conceived of in the philosophical discourse becomes clearer. Selfconsciousness is consciousness-of-consciousness, or the “ability to reflect upon [one’s] conscious
experience and thoughts” (Andrews, 52). It seems this is an ability of a higher kind, such that not
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all animals who are conscious are also self-conscious. Thus, the question arises: which animals are
self-conscious, and which are not? Secondary to this question, another asks: what is the
phylogenetic distribution of self-consciousness in the animal kingdom? To answer these questions,
a theory of self-consciousness must provide a means of distinguishing between animals which are
and who are not self-conscious. In this project, I aim to develop such a theory. I propose that there
are three conditions which are necessary and jointly sufficient for an animal to be self-conscious,
those being: (1) a complex nervous system, (2) communication, and (3) collaborative social play.
Indeed, I find that these conditions are each individually necessary and jointly sufficient, such that
if an animal meets all three conditions, they must be self-conscious. Likewise, if an animal is selfconscious, they necessarily meet all three conditions.
I begin this project with an extended discussion of the phenomenon of self-consciousness.
In the first chapter, I carefully consider how self-consciousness ought to be defined and
demonstrate the foundational aspects of the phenomenon from which the three proposed conditions
arise. In the second chapter, I argue that only those animals whose nervous systems have the
capacity for centralized attention meet the first condition set forth for animal self-consciousness,
that being a complex nervous system. Through the investigation of the appearance and evolution
of the nervous system in the animal kingdom, I find that it is only the third stage of complexity,
centralized attention, which is adequately complex for self-consciousness. In the third chapter, I
argue that only those animals whose communicative utterances fit the intentional account of
communication meet the second condition set forth for animal self-consciousness, that being
communication. Indeed, I explore three different accounts of animal communication and find that
the Gricean interpretation of the intentional account points towards a sense of self, and as such the
emergence of self-consciousness. Meanwhile, in the fourth chapter, I consider two forms social
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play and argue that only those animals who demonstrate the self-handicapping and role-reversal,
meet the third condition set forth for animal self-consciousness, that being collaborative social
play. In the fifth and final chapter, I anticipate some potential objections to my proposal. I
investigate some of the traditional criticisms against each of the three conditions, those being (1)
a complex nervous system, (2) communication, and (3) collaborative social play, and aim to
demonstrate that by treating the three conditions as necessary and jointly sufficient, my proposal
overcomes those criticisms.
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CHAPTER 1
In this chapter, I provide an extended discussion of the phenomenon of self-consciousness;
how it ought to be defined and the role it plays in animal cognition more generally. As seen in the
introduction, self-consciousness is often characterized as consciousness-of-consciousness; yet this
definition is too broad for its investigation throughout this project. Thus, I turn to the work of
Bekoff and Sherman, who detail an account of the varying degrees of self-knowledge in the animal
kingdom, of which self-consciousness is the highest degree (Bekoff and Sherman, 2004).
According to Bekoff and Sherman, self-knowledge refers to an animal’s capacity of having a sense
of self, which can be mapped across a continuum ranging from self-referencing to self-awareness
to self-consciousness (Bekoff and Sherman, 2004). Through the consideration of this continuum,
I aim to establish the exact nature of self-consciousness with which this project concerns itself
with. Furthermore, I hope to demonstrate the foundational aspects of the phenomenon from which
the three necessary and jointly sufficient conditions, those being (1) a complex nervous system,
(2) communication and (3) collaborative social play, arise.

1.1 Self-Consciousness: Dichotomy or Continuum
When exploring a means of distinguishing between which animals are and are not selfconscious, one question in particular seems to be related; should self-consciousness be conceived
of as a binary phenomenon, or does the phenomenon admit degrees (Allen and Trestman, 66)? In
order to answer this question about self-consciousness, specifically, it is helpful to turn to the
philosophical considerations of the same question about consciousness more generally. Those who
ascribe to the view that consciousness is binary embrace the idea that it is dichotomous by nature
(Allen and Trestman, 66). According to this view, an animal either is or is not conscious, as an all
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or nothing perspective (Allen and Trestman, 66). However, this dichotomous view immediately
imposes limitations on the way in which one aims at distinguishing between which animals are
and are not self-conscious. Indeed, it renders necessary the determination of where to draw the
line of consciousness. Thus, it asks the following questions: what is the line of consciousness and
how do we settle on it? These are questions which point to the issue of how one ought to
operationalize consciousness. One might wonder whether the line depends entirely on the
observable behaviors of an animal, or if they include neurobiological substrates? Or perhaps, could
it be a combination of both? For example, what happens if the criteria for consciousness includes
a necessary condition of behavior X, yet an animal does not exhibit behavior X, not because it is
not conscious, but rather because the criteria is misguided. Or for example, what happens in terms
of neurobiological substrates; how does one determine whether the neurobiological substrates of
the animal are the same or sufficiently similar to humans to extrapolate that they are conscious.
These examples highlight that any determination of the criteria for consciousness would be rather
arbitrary. Moreover, they raise the question if it could ever be known whether those are the right
criteria. Thus, conceiving of consciousness as binary is unconvincing. That is, if selfconsciousness is binary, as an all or nothing phenomenon, then it would seem that a determination
of criteria for consciousness is necessary. But this determination, as seen above, comes at a serious
cost to the question of how to operationalize consciousness. So, it would be better to reject the idea
of consciousness as a binary phenomenon and, instead, to conceive of it as admitting degrees.
As before, it is helpful to turn to the considerations of consciousness more generally when
exploring whether self-consciousness admits degrees. One of the first philosophers to express that
consciousness might be best conceived of in terms of degrees was Charles Darwin. In The Descent
of Man, Darwin claims:
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The difference in mind between man and the higher animals, great as it is, certainly
is one of degree and not of kind. We have seen that the senses and intuitions, the
various emotions and faculties, such as love, memory, attention, curiosity,
imitation, reason, &c., of which man boasts, may be found in an incipient, or even
sometimes in a well-developed condition (Darwin, 1889).
In this passage, Darwin states the differences in minds are ‘of degree and not of kind,’ such that
the Darwinian approach suggests that an animal either is or is not conscious, and that different
animals likely exhibit varying degrees of consciousness. Thus, this approach is inconsistent with
the binary view, and supports the view which finds that the conception of consciousness as
admitting degrees provides a better an explanation for the observed range of behaviors, senses,
intuitions, emotions and faculties across the animal kingdom.
Contemporary philosophers, such as William Lycan and Daniel Dennett, follow suit from
Darwin and also subscribe to the view that consciousness admits degrees. They embrace the view
that, across the animal kingdom, consciousness occurs on a spectrum (Allen and Trestman, 66).
For example, Lycan provides a functionalist account of the mind, in which “consciousness is
internal monitoring… [and] consists in the operation of inner sense” (Gertler, 1998). This ‘inner
sense’ view, as Brie Gertler calls it, allows Lycan to defend his near paradoxical account, in which
“there is a meaningful sense in which a system with a minimal degree of consciousness is not
‘really’ conscious” (Allen and Trestman, 66). This view emphasizes the notion of the phenomenon
occurring on a spectrum, in which different animals might possess different degrees of
consciousness. Similarly, Dennett, who believes consciousness is merely an illusion, argues that
consciousness must admit degrees on the basis that any claim to the contrary would depend on an
outdated assumption of a dividing line; one that distinguishes arbitrarily between animals who are
and who are not conscious (Dennett, 1995). Through Dennett’s argument it is evident that the view
claiming consciousness admits degrees overcomes the limitations seen above in the binary view;
namely the arbitrary nature of criteria which would decide where to draw the line of consciousness.
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It seems, then, that the phenomenon of self-consciousness might best be conceived of as admitting
degrees.
However, it is probable that self-consciousness itself does not admit degrees, and that
instead, it itself is the highest degree of some conscious capacity. Indeed, this is the view taken by
Bekoff and Sherman in their article entitled “Consciousness and Self in Animals: Some
Reflections.” Bekoff and Sherman argue that self-consciousness is the highest degree of an
animal’s capacity of having a sense of self, a capacity to which they refer to as self-knowledge
(Bekoff and Sherman, 2004). The central hypothesis put forward in their text is “that species [of
animals] exhibit different degrees of self-cognizance [or self-knowledge], which reflect variations
in their social environments and life histories” (Bekoff and Sherman, 2004). Thus, Bekoff and
Sherman propose that self-knowledge admits degrees, and can be mapped across a continuum
ranging from self-referencing to self-awareness to self-consciousness (Bekoff and Sherman,
2004). The point on the continuum at which an animal is located, and as such the level of selfknowledge it exhibits, is determined by the extent to which they “benefit from reflecting on their
own behaviors in light of the previous responses of conspecifics, and dynamically and adaptively
adjusting their future behaviors accordingly” (Bekoff and Sherman, 2004). This can otherwise be
understood as the extent to which they are consciously involved in reflecting on the outcomes of
their behaviors in their interactions with others, and the probability that they will adjust that
behavior to their benefit in the future. A close examination of the proposed continuum
demonstrates the subtle differences in the degrees of self-knowledge and highlights why selfconsciousness is the highest degree an animal can exhibit. In what follows I will discuss each
degree of self-knowledge outlined by Bekoff and Sherman, to establish a concrete definition of
self-consciousness to be used throughout this project.
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1.2 The Continuum of Self-Knowledge
1.2.1 Self-Referencing
According to Bekoff and Sherman, the first and lowest degree on the continuum of selfknowledge is self-referencing. Self-referencing refers to a perceptual capacity or recognition
process in which the discriminating agent (animal) compares phenotypic characteristics of a target
to itself, the discriminator (Bekoff and Sherman, 2004; Hauber and Sherman, 2001). These
phenotypic characteristics, also known as labels, include odor or appearance, and are learned by
the discriminator at a young age (Bekoff and Sherman, 2004 and Hauber and Sherman, 2001). The
discriminator then uses these labels in order to determine the similarity of the target to itself; if it
is similar, the target “is recognized and accepted based on the degree of similarity” (Bekoff and
Sherman, 2004). If it is not similar and not recognized by the discriminator, the target is rejected
(Bekoff and Sherman, 2004). One of the most common forms of self-referencing in the animal
kingdom is known as kin recognition (Mateo, 2010). Kin recognition allows for an animal to
successfully recognize and accept their kin; parents, siblings and half-siblings, by “an internal
process of assessing genetic relatedness” inferred from its own phenotypic characteristics (Mateo,
2004). For example, evidence suggests after hibernation, ground squirrels are able to recognize
and accept their mothers and littermates, “but not previously familiar nonkin” (Mateo, 2010). Thus,
kin recognition demonstrates the robustness of the capacity for self-referencing; however, it seems,
that self-referencing “can be reflexive and noncognitive, even occurring in the immune system and
in creatures without brains” (Bekoff and Sherman, 2004). As a reflexive and noncognitive
capacity, which seemingly operates at an unconscious level, self-referencing is the lowest degree
of self-knowledge, that is not limited to the animal kingdom.
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1.2.2 Self-Awareness
The second degree on the continuum of self-knowledge mapped by Bekoff and Sherman
is self-awareness, the capacity by which an animal is able to distinguish its own body from the
bodies of others. Self-awareness is also otherwise referred to as a ‘perceptual consciousness’,
‘body-ness’ or ‘mine-ness’ (Bekoff and Sherman, 2004). Bekoff and Sherman claim that this
degree of self-knowledge is necessary for an animal to successfully exist in a social context with
others, “to find mates, to evade predators, or to avoid bumping into each other” (Bekoff and
Sherman, 2004). This is the degree of self-knowledge most of us would automatically attribute to
our house pets. For example, it certainly seems that a dog has a sense of mine-ness when he is
protective of his bone or his territory when he relentlessly barks at the neighbor’s dog walking by.
In addition to the distinctive notion of ‘body-ness’ or ‘mine-ness’ that characterizes selfawareness, Bekoff and Sherman argue this degree of self-knowledge is dependent on the existence
of a brain (Bekoff and Sherman, 2004). Their argument, here, is that the discrimination of
possessions as ‘mine’ which occurs in self-awareness, either consciously or unconsciously,
requires a perceptual and integrative processor. This perceptual and integrative processor, thereby,
must be the brain, which integrates and mediates inputs and outputs. Still, this is not the highest
degree on the continuum of self-knowledge, nor the degree with which this project concerns itself
with.

1.2.3 Self-Consciousness
According to Bekoff and Sherman, self-consciousness is the highest degree of selfknowledge observed in the animal kingdom. They find the term self-consciousness synonymous
with ‘reflective consciousness,’ ‘I-ness’ and the ‘I-self’ (Bekoff and Sherman, 2004). Further,
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Bekoff and Sherman define self-consciousness as the sense of a named self to which one’s own
body belongs (Bekoff and Sherman, 2004). That is, “knowing that ‘this body is me’ and thinking
about one’s self and one’s own behavior in relation to the actions of others” (Bekoff and Sherman,
2004). Therefore, self-consciousness differs from self-referencing and self-awareness because the
product or effect of the phenomenon is an animal’s understanding of its own self. Other
philosophers have defined self-consciousness in a similar way, as the “awareness of one’s self
narrative” (Andrews, 70), as “consciousness of one’s existence as a continuous agent who moves
through the world in time” (Andrews, 70), or as “an awareness of (some of) one’s own mental
states such as feelings, desires and beliefs” (DeGrazia, 2009). Taken together, it seems that the
phenomenon of self-consciousness not only requires that an animal has mental states, but also the
awareness of those mental states (DeGrazia, 2009).
Bekoff and Sherman provide an outline of both the requirements for and effects of selfconsciousness, on animal cognition more generally. The outline of those requirements is the
following:
A brain is required, and the underlying processes are conscious… We hypothesize
that self-consciousness evolves when individuals benefit from analyzing and
revising their own behavior in light of how specific members of their social group
responded to their behavior in the past. Self-consciousness leads to dynamic and
finely graded behavioral outputs” (Bekoff and Sherman, 2004).
Although this conception of self-consciousness is well conceived, it lacks a means for selfconsciousness to be operationalized. One oft-recognized attempt at quantifying self-consciousness
was proposed by psychologist Gordon G. Gallup, about thirty years ago (Bekoff and Sherman,
2004). He developed the mirror test for self-recognition, but recently philosophers and scientists
alike have criticized inferences made by the test (Bekoff and Sherman, 2004). In what follows I
will discuss the mirror test proposed by Gallup and its shortcomings. I will then discuss the
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foundational aspects of self-consciousness found in Bekoff and Sherman’s outline seen above and
demonstrate how my proposal of the three conditions for animal self-consciousness thereby arise.

1.3 The Mirror Test and its Shortcomings in Quantifying Self-Consciousness
1.3.1 The Mirror Test
Gallup’s proposal for the mirror test stems from the idea that if an animal is able to
recognize itself in a mirror, then it must be the case that is it self-conscious. Here, Gallup differs
slightly from Bekoff and Sherman’s definition of self-consciousness. Gallup’s notion is based on
the belief that self-recognition is an indicator for self-consciousness, such that it “requires the
individual to become the object of [their] own attention, and that involves a concept of self”
(Andrews, 71) where “a concept of self entails being able to introspect” (Gallup, 1998). To assess
the validity of this idea, Gallup designed the mirror test as a measurement for the capacity of selfconsciousness through the observation of self-recognition. In the mirror test, the animal of interest
is marked with a symbol above one eye and the top half of the opposite ear (Gallup, 1998). A
mirror is then introduced into the animal’s environment; the animal is said to demonstrate selfrecognition, and therefore be self-conscious, if it is able to identify the mark as an affliction of the
self by touching it on their own face, rather than in the reflected image in the mirror (Gallup, 1998).
The first successful response to the mirror test was observed in chimpanzees, who were
anesthetized and marked with a nonodorous and nonirritating red dye (Gallup, 1998). Prior to the
introduction of the mirror in their environment the chimpanzees did not seem to be aware of the
mark, but when the mirror was introduced they “guided their fingers to the marks on their faces…
[and after] touching the marks repeatedly and looking at their fingers, some even smelled their
fingers” (Gallup, 1998). Thus, chimpanzees were believed to demonstrate self-recognition and it
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was inferred that they are self-conscious. Following this first success, the mirror test became the
paradigmatic method of determining which animals are self-conscious (Bekoff and Sherman,
2004).

1.3.2 The Shortcomings of the Mirror Test
However, recently philosophers and scientists alike have highlighted methodological
issues with the mirror test (Andrews, 70; Bekoff and Sherman, 2004). They criticize the methods
of interpreting results, such that “it can yield false negatives: if an individual fails the test, it does
not necessarily mean that the animal is not self-conscious” (Bekoff and Sherman, 2004). A number
of circumstances can be cited in support of this criticism: if the animal’s primary sensory modality
is a sense other than vision, if the animal exhibits a different behavioral response during selfrecognition and if the animal does not look in the mirror to avoid eye contact (Bekoff and Sherman,
2004). Under these circumstances the animal may fail the mirror test, but ought not be dismissed
as lacking self-consciousness. For example, according to the mirror test’s standards, bottlenose
dolphins fail the self-recognition task. Yet dolphins do not have hands with which they can touch
the mark. Thus, some have pointed out that dolphins might demonstrate self-recognition through
a different behavioral response. Indeed, “dolphins were observed to spend more time in front of
the mirror when they had a mark on that side, and would wiggle to position their body so that they
could see the mark” (Andrews, 71). Similarly, for gorillas making eye contact is an aversive
behavior, so they might not look into the mirror directly and might not notice the mark. Given
these examples, it seems that failing the mirror test cannot be treated as evidence that an animal is
not self-conscious. Therefore, another means of determining whether an animal is self-conscious
is required.
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1.4 Conclusion and Foundation of New Proposal for Determining Self-Consciousness
In this project I aim to overcome the shortcomings of the mirror test and propose a new set
of criteria to determine which animals exhibit the highest degree of self-knowledge, namely selfconsciousness. To establish the foundational aspects of this new theory I return to the definition
of self-consciousness provided by Bekoff and Sherman. According to Bekoff and Sherman, selfconsciousness is an animal’s sense of having a self to which their own body belongs (Bekoff and
Sherman, 2004). Further, self-consciousness requires a brain, benefits the animal in their reflection
of experiences in the social context and allows for dynamic and finely graded outputs (Bekoff and
Sherman, 2004). These are the foundational aspects from which my proposal arises; that selfconsciousness is dependent on the simultaneous occurrence of three conditions: (1) a complex
nervous system, (2) communication, and (3) collaborative social play. Insofar, I believe these three
conditions are necessary and jointly sufficient for animal self-consciousness. The first condition is
based in Bekoff and Sherman’s claim that the phenomenon requires a brain. I aim to elaborate on
this and establish at which stage in evolution of the nervous system it is adequately complex for
the emergence of self-consciousness. The second condition is based in the notion that
communication, specifically intentional communication, is seminal for the emergence of selfconsciousness. Finally, the third condition is based in the idea that collaborative social play, is the
result of dynamic and finely grained outputs resulting in self-consciousness. Throughout the next
three chapters I closely investigate each condition proposed for animal self-consciousness.
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CHAPTER 2
In this chapter, I explore the first condition proposed for animal self-consciousness, namely
a complex nervous system. I begin with an evolutionary discussion of the nervous system more
generally, and address what I mean when I refer to complexity. Indeed, the notion of complexity I
employ here refers to a functional organization between neurons. I go on to identify three stages
in the evolution of the nervous system, each of which can be understood as increasing levels of
complexity. The first stage in the evolution of the nervous system I identify is widespread signal
transmission which occurs in nerve nets, the second is signal boosting and the third is centralized
attention. Through the consideration of each stage, I find that for self-consciousness the nervous
system process signals in a meaningful way. Using Giorgio Marchetti’s understanding of the
relationship between meaning and the self, I demonstrate that self-consciousness is dependent on
meaning. I find that it is only the third stage in the evolution of the nervous system, centralized
attention, which is adequately complex to process signals in a meaningful way. Thus, any animal
whose nervous system has the capacity for centralized attention, meets the first necessary condition
set forth for animal self-consciousness.

2.1 Neurons: The Building Blocks of the Nervous System
Neurons are the cellular building blocks of the nervous system. They comprise the majority
of the system, and themselves possess an unusual shape allowing for specialized cell-to-cell
signaling (Graziano, 9 and Godfrey-Smith, 22-23). A neuron consists of four microdomains; a cell
body or soma with multiple branches called dendrites, as well as a long protrusion or axon ending
at its terminal. This shape results in the possibility of creating an elaborate maze of connections
between the terminal of one neuron and the dendrites of other neurons (Godfrey-Smith, 22). When
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one neuron becomes electrically excited, an action potential is propagated along the axon at a rate
of two-hundred feet per second (Graziano, 9). Here, the action potential can be thought of as a
“wave of electrochemical energy [that] sweeps across the membrane of the cell from one end to
the other” (Graziano, 9). Following the arrival of the action potential at the terminal, the neuron
releases a small amount of neurotransmitter across the synaptic cleft between the terminal of the
releasing neuron and the dendrite of the receiving neuron. The neurotransmitter then binds to
receptors on the receiving neuron and either triggers or suppresses a subsequent action potential
in that neuron (Godfrey-Smith, 23). This, in short, is how neurons transmit signals to one another.
However, cell-to-cell signaling via action potentials is not tied to the appearance of neurons; action
potentials “existed in cells before animals evolved and exist today outside of them” (GodfreySmith, 23). Similarly, cell-to-cell signaling itself is commonly observed in the biological realm
outside of the animal kingdom. Thus, one might wonder, what is unique about the cell-to-cell
signaling that occurs between neurons?
There are two principles which are most commonly cited for the particular quality of the
cell-to-cell signaling that occurs between neurons (Godfrey-Smith, 23). First, signal transmission
in between neurons is incredibly fast. As stated before, an action potential travels along the axon
of a single neuron at a rate of two-hundred feet per second. This means that the influences of one
neuron on another can occur seemingly instantaneously. For example, consider what happens
when one accidently steps on a dog’s paws when hectically moving around. One observes a reflex
in which the dog pulls away his paw almost immediately: sensory neurons in the paw send
information from the paw to the spinal cord, and motor neurons in the spinal cord send information
back to the paw in a matter of milliseconds. This illustrates that the speed at which neurons are
able to transmit signals allows for an animal to seamlessly interact with its environment. Second,
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signal transmission between neurons is targeted. For example, neurons are able to act upon specific
cells involved in the desired output. Indeed, some neurons release or respond only to a select
number of neurotransmitters, while others have extended axons that “reach some distance through
the brain or body and affect just a few distant cells” (Godfrey-Smith, 23). Similarly, neurons are
able to respond to specific signals involved in the desired input, as demonstrated in the visual
cortex where neurons selectively respond to lines of light at various orientations. In accordance
with the principles of fast and targeted signaling, neurons set the stage for a demarcation in which
cell-to-cell signaling is transformed from “an activity in which cells simply broadcast their signals
to whoever is close enough and listening into something different: an organized network”
(Godfrey-Smith, 23). The emergence of this organized network can be thought of as the appearance
of the nervous system in the animal kingdom.

2.2 The Appearance of the Nervous System in the Animal Kingdom
The appearance of the nervous system in the animal kingdom seems to correspond with the
advent of multicellular organisms, occurring between 600 and 700 million years ago (Graziano,
8). Indeed, sea sponges, the earliest of all multicellular animals to arise about 700 million years
ago, share 25 of the genes involved in the development of the nervous system in humans today
(Sakarya et al., 2007). However, in lacking a specified body plan, sea sponges show no evidence
of an actualized nervous system, thus placing them at its “evolutionary threshold” (Graziano, 9).
Genetic analyses from sea jellies point towards the arrival of the first actualized nervous system a
mere 50 million years later (Erwin et al., 2004). One might conceive of sea jellies as “something
soft, with no shell or skeleton, probably hovering in the water… a filmy lightbulb in which the
rhythms of nervous activity first began” (Godfrey-Smith, 27). This suggests that an organized
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network of neurons, and as such the nervous system, first appeared in the animal kingdom between
the arrival of sea sponges and sea jellies, some 650 to 700 million years ago (Graziano, 9).
However, the beginnings of a nervous system described in sea jellies is not nearly as complex as
those which have evolved and are observed later, with the arrival of mammals, cephalopods and
reptiles.

2.3 The Levels of Complexity in the Evolution of the Nervous System
Below I outline three stages in the evolution of the nervous system, which ought to be
understood as stages of increasing levels of complexity within the nervous system itself. Recall
that in this chapter I aim to establish at which stage in the evolution of the nervous system, it is
adequately complex for animal self-consciousness. Prior to the investigation of those stages, there
are two aspects to my argument which must be clarified; the first being what I mean when I refer
to a level of complexity and second being why I choose to highlight the following three stages in
the evolution of the nervous system in particular. First, the term “complexity” points to a number
of different possible interpretations, such as the level of organization, the connectivity between
parts, or the sophistication of function. Each of these interpretations would impact my argument,
that a particular level of complexity of the nervous system is required for self-consciousness, in a
different way. For the purpose of this chapter and project more generally, the interpretation of
complexity I employ is level of organization. Specifically, the level of organization between
neurons, where a nervous system with a high level of complexity demonstrates a high level of
organization between neurons. I believe this is a functional organization, without which there is
merely chaos, such that it exists for the purpose of doing something (more on what that something
is later, hint: to process signals in a meaningful way). Thus, in this project, complexity does not
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imply more connections. In fact, evidence from the development of the human nervous system,
indicates that organization results from an important process of pruning, in which unused
connections between neurons are lost.
The second aspect of my argument which must be clarified is that the three stages in the
evolution of the nervous system highlighted below seem to have evolved in a particular order, such
that each level of complexity follows from the other. Further, these stages are important to the
emergence of animal self-consciousness in particular. Here, it is important to make clear that the
evolutionary history of the nervous system can be mapped in a number of different ways. That is,
the interpretation of which moments in the evolution of the nervous system are important is
significantly informed by the investigator’s perspective. For example, one perspective might focus
on the nervous system’s structural evolution through the consideration of changes in
neuroanatomy, while another perspective might focus on its functional evolution through the
consideration of changes in the biological processes. Thus, depending on the investigator’s
perspective, the moments mapped in the evolutionary history might vary, although underlying
phylogenetic relationships of those moments, which are independent of the investigator, do not. In
addition to the investigator’s perspective, the focal point of the project also informs the
interpretation of which moments in the evolution of the nervous system are important. In this
project, dependent on my perspective, the three stages in the evolution of the nervous system which
I highlight, reflect its functional evolution, as each stage is understood as an increasing level of
complexity. Recall, that increased levels of complexity are characterized by increased levels of
organization between neurons. Moreover, dependent on the focal point of this project, in which I
aim to establish a new set of conditions for animal self-consciousness, the three stages highlighted
in what follows are those which are integral leading up to the emergence of self-consciousness.
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2.3.1 The First Stage in the Evolution of the Nervous System
The first stage or level of complexity I identify in the evolution of the nervous system is
widespread signal transmission which occurs in nerve nets (Graziano, 9). Nerve nets are commonly
understood as networks of neurons forming mesh-like structures that span across the body of an
animal and form connections between the animal’s muscles (Hejnol and Rentzsch, 2015; Graziano,
9). These mesh-like structures lend themselves to a number of unique qualities in relation to the
functional aspects of widespread signal transmission, which characterize this first stage in the
evolution of the nervous system. The first of these qualities is that signal transmission occurs in
any direction across the nerve net itself (Hejnol and Rentzsch, 2015). By allowing for signal
transmission to occur in any direction, nerve nets overcome the potential limitations of a simple
organization, and as such are “sufficient to form the integrative part between reception of the
environment of an organism and its ability to react to changes in these environmental cues” (Hejnol
and Rentzsch, 2015). Thus, the widespread signal transmission occurring in nerve nets provide the
animal with the capacity to receive and respond to cues from their environment. Another unique
quality of the widespread signal transmission occurring in nerve nets is that signal transmission
occurs indiscriminately. This means that signals, both sensory input and motor output, spread
throughout the whole nerve net, and as such the whole body of the animal. One oft-cited example
of this occurs in the hydra, a small water animal similar to sea jellies. If the hydra is prodded at
one point in its body (sensory input), the whole hydra twitches in response (motor output)
(Graziano, 9). Thus, this widespread signal transmission in nerve nets highlight a relatively equal
distribution of neurons throughout the entirety of the animal tissue at this stage in the evolution of
the nervous system (Hejnol and Rentzsch, 2015). However, this widespread transmission is only
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possible because, in the strict sense, nerve nets do not have “any ganglion-like accumulations of
nerve cells or bundles of neurites” (Hejnol and Rentzsch, 2015).

2.3.2 The Second Stage in the Evolution of the Nervous System
The second stage or level of complexity in the evolution of the nervous system quickly
follows from mere signal transmission, as seen in nerve nets, to signal boosting (Graziano, 10).
Signal boosting or enhancing is “the ability to enhance some signals over others… [and] is one of
the most basic ways neurons manipulate information” (Graziano, 10). At the cellular level of the
nervous system, this occurs via a process known as lateral inhibition, in which a signal is enhanced
as a “consequence of neurons inhibiting their neighbors” (Graziano, 10). One of the most
prominent examples of this principle in the animal kingdom is observed in the crab’s compound
eye, which contains clusters of light detectors (Graziano, 10). Those light detectors each contain a
neuron that is connected to the neurons of neighboring detectors within the cluster, such that when
light hits the crab’s eye:
A neuron in one detector becomes active, [and] it tends to suppress the activity of
the other neurons in the neighboring detectors, like a person in a crowd who is
trying to shout the loudest while shushing the people nearest to him… The pattern
of activity across the set of detectors in the eye not only signals a bright spot, but
also signals a ring of darkness around it. The signal is, in this way, enhanced
(Graziano, 10).
The example of lateral inhibition in the crab’s eye, however, is only one instance of the basic
principle of signal boosting that occurs in the nervous system. Indeed, signal boosting seems to
occur at multiple levels of signal processing, “from the eye to the highest levels of thought in the
cerebral cortex” (Graziano, 11).
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2.3.3 The Third Stage in the Evolution of the Nervous System
Meanwhile, the third stage or level of complexity I identify in the evolution of the nervous
system in the animal kingdom is centralized attention (Graziano, 11). Centralized attention allows
for multimodal signal integration; the pooling and sorting of information from a number of sensory
inputs, such as vision, olfaction and touch (Graziano, 12). In turn, multimodal signal integration
allows for the animal to exhibit a “coordination between parts… [for] the task of generating
coherent whole-organism actions” (Godfrey-Smith, 23-24). So, centralized attention as
multimodal signal integration allows for the animal to identify and respond to the most important
signal in its current environment. As such, it allows for a “meaningful response” (Graziano, 12).
However, for this to be observed in an animal, there must be one place in the nervous system where
the convergence of signals occurs. Therefore, it is proposed that this stage in the evolution of the
nervous system requires a central attention processor (Graziano, 12). Such a processor is most
often conceived of as a central brain or an “aggregate of neurons [or ganglion] in the head that is
larger than any of the others in the body” (Graziano, 12). Given these hypotheses, one can infer
that centralized attention is likely displayed by most vertebrates who have a central brain similar
to our own, as well as arthropods including crabs, insects and spiders, who have a central ganglion
located in their head. Furthermore, recent studies indicate that certain cephalopods, such as
octopuses, squid and cuttlefish also have developed a complex central brain, and as such likely
also display centralized attention (Graziano, 13).

2.4 Levels of Complexity and the Emergence of Self-Consciousness
Before discussing the complexity in each stage and its relation to the emergence of animal
self-consciousness, here, it would be helpful to recall the aim of this project more generally.
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Throughout this project, I aim to establish a new set of conditions to determine which animals are
and are not self-consciousness. That is, which animals exhibit an understanding of their own self,
such that they have mental states along with an awareness of those mental states (DeGrazia, 2009).
In the previous chapter, I established three conditions which are necessary and jointly sufficient
for animal self-consciousness. Those being: (1) a complex nervous system, (2) communication,
and (3) collaborative behavior, such that animal self-consciousness is dependent on the
simultaneous occurrence of all three conditions. In this chapter I explore the evolution of the
necessary complexity of the nervous system, as the first of those conditions. As argued in the
previous chapter, this condition is informed by Bekoff and Sherman’s definition of selfconsciousness, one aspect of which is its dependent on the presence of a brain or brain-like
structure (Bekoff and Sherman, 2004). If one were to consider the three stages discussed above,
solely in regard the presence of a brain or brain-like structure, there would be a straightforward
answer concerning which stages meet this standard for the first and third stages, but not the second.
The first stage, widespread signal transmission occurring in nerve nets, would fail because
in the strict sense nerve nets have no brain or brain-like structure (Hejnol and Rentzsch, 2015).
The third stage, centralized attention, would meet the standard because it depends on a central
attention processor, namely a brain (Graziano, 12). However, the second stage would fall
somewhere in between failing and meeting the standard, because signal boosting can occur both
in a non-brain structure (as in an eye), as well as in a brain (as a part of higher levels of thought
meditated in the cerebral cortex) (Graziano, 11). The notion that the second stage would fall
somewhere in between points to why, in this chapter, I elaborate on a necessary level of
complexity. By turning to complexity, I overcome the limitations of considering the presence of a
brain alone and address an aspect of the nervous system that seems crucial for the emergence of
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self-consciousness. This aspect is the difference between nervous systems which merely transmit
signals and nervous systems which process signals in a meaningful way, so that they are
“consciously experienced” (Vitti, 2010). Thus, for an animal to meet the first condition, its nervous
system must demonstrate an adequate level of complexity to process signals in a meaningful way.

2.4.1 Meaningful Processing and What it has to do with Self-Consciousness
As addressed above, for an animal to meet the first condition set forth for selfconsciousness, its nervous system must be adequately complex to process signals in a meaningful
way. In this way self-consciousness is dependent on meaning. But then, one might wonder: what
is the sense of meaning employed here? Here, I follow a tradition in philosophy of mind, in which
I employ the semantic theory of meaning. The semantic theory of meaning concerns itself with
assigning semantic content to a symbol or expression. It is “a specification of the meanings of the
words and sentences of some symbol system” (“Theories of Meaning,” 2010). Within the sematic
theory, there are two aspects of a word which together is its meaning. The first component is that
the word picks out a thing in the world, its reference, while the second component is that the word
beings about concepts or ideas about a thing in the world, its sense (Frege, 1952). However, the
concepts or ideas also point towards a thing in the world, such that there is a relationship between
a mental state and a thing in the world. This relationship is commonly referred to as mental
representation (“Theories of Meaning,” 2010). Thereby, the semantic theory indicates that to
process signals in a meaningful way has something to do with mental representation, which allows
for a thing in the world to be significant to the individual.
Philosopher Giorgio Marchetti claims that when an animal has the capacity to process
signals in a meaningful way, the animal who “consciously experiences it, knows, what it means to
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him” (Marchetti, 2017). So, Marchetti finds that meaning provides the animal with three aspects
of information about his conscious experience:
(1) That his experience has a content [a phenomenal quality of “what it is like”],
and what the content is… (2) that the experience he is having differs from other
kinds of experiences that he already had or could potentially have… and (3) that
the experience he is having is his own, that is, it belongs to him and no one else
(Marchetti, 2017).
According to Marchetti, these three aspects of information about the animal’s conscious
experience always already contains within itself a reference to the existence of a self (Marchetti,
2017). This self is represented in the nervous system and acts as the mechanism through which the
animal is reduced to a single entity. Moreover, this self “supplies the system with the sense of
being a unique, single entity, which evolutionarily culminates in the appearance of selfconsciousness” (Marchetti, 2017). I use Marchetti’s work to explicate the relationship between
meaning and self-consciousness, however, I differ in my understanding of the direction of
dependence. Marchetti claims that meaning is dependent on self-consciousness, while I claim that
self-consciousness is dependent on meaning, such that the direction of dependence is reversed.

2.4.2 Meaningful Processing in Centralized Attention
As seen above, meaning and self-consciousness are intricately interwoven, such that selfconsciousness is dependent on meaning. Recall too that meaning stems from the adequate
complexity of the nervous system, defined as a functional organization between neurons. In
returning to the discussion about which of the three stages in the evolution of the nervous system
is adequately complex to meet the first condition for self-consciousness, and in employing the
notion of meaning, it is once again immediately apparent that the first stage fails to be adequately
complex. The characteristic widespread signal transmission occurring in nerve nets, is not
adequately complex to process signals in a meaningful way. Indeed, as established earlier, a unique
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quality of nerve nets is the indiscriminate transmission of signals. The term “indiscriminate” refers
to a process of doing something in a random or unsystematic manner (Merriam-Webster, 2021).
Indiscriminate transmission exists in direct opposition to complexity, which invokes the notion of
functional organization. Further, without adequate complexity, it seems nerve nets do not produce
the kind of meaning upon which self-consciousness is dependent; and that instead, they merely
transmit signals. Thus, widespread signal transmission occurring in nerve nets is not adequately
complex to meet the first condition for self-consciousness.
Meanwhile, the second stage in the evolution of the nervous system, signal boosting,
demonstrates increased complexity. Signal boosting demonstrates early levels of complexity or
functional organization in the nervous system, as it requires neurons to systematically inhibit their
neighbors to enhance their signals and respond to their environment in a targeted way. But the
question remains, is signal boosting adequately complex to process signals in a meaningful way,
as to meet the first condition for self-consciousness? There are several mechanisms which
seemingly respond to their environment in a targeted way without processing signals in a
meaningful way. For example, a thermostat receives information (or signals) about the temperature
of the room and responds by adjusting the amount of hot or cold air that is blown into that room.
However, it is fair to assume that the thermostat is not processing signals in a meaningful way, nor
conscious of them. It seems, then, that a system which is adequately complex to respond to the
environment in a targeted way, does not necessarily demonstrate adequate complexity to process
signals in a meaningful way. Thus, signal booting, also does not produce meaning upon which
self-consciousness is dependent and is not adequately complex to meet the first condition for selfconsciousness. Nonetheless, it can be thought of as an integral stage in the evolution of the nervous
system leading up to the complexity required for self-consciousness.
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The third stage in the evolution of the nervous system, centralized attention, however, does
demonstrate adequate complexity to process signals in a meaningful way. Centralized attention by
definition is a result of the multimodal integration of inputs in a highly complex, or functionally
organized system. Further, it allows for the animal to identify and respond to the most important
signal in its current environment, and as such for the animal to have a “meaningful response,”
(Graziano, 12) as to process signals in a meaningful way. Recall that according to Marchetti’s
work, the relation between meaning and self-consciousness is that meaning already always
contains within itself a reference to the existence of a self (Marchetti, 2017). Recall also that I use
Marchetti’s understanding of the relationship between meaning and a sense of self to demonstrate
that self-consciousness is dependent on meaning. Therefore, as centralized attention is adequately
complex to process signals in a meaningful way which points to a sense of self, centralized
attention meets the first condition set forth for self-consciousness.

2.5 Conclusion
In sum, I have demonstrated that centralized attention, the third stage in the evolution of
the nervous system, is adequately complex to meet the first condition for animal selfconsciousness. In this chapter, I found that complexity of the nervous system is defined by the
functional organization between neurons; and that a nervous system is only adequately complex
for self-consciousness if it allows for signals to be processed in a meaningful way. Indeed, using
Marchetti’s claim that meaning always already contains within itself a reference to the self, I
argued that self-consciousness is dependent on meaning. I found that both the first and second
stages in the evolution of the nervous system, widespread signal transmission occurring nerve nets
and signal boosting, lack the functional organization to process signals in a meaningful way, and
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so fail to be adequately complex for animal self-consciousness. However, the third stage in the
evolution of the nervous system, namely centralized attention, demonstrates the functional
organization required to process signals in a meaningful way. That is, centralized attention
demonstrates multimodal signal integration in a central attention processor or brain. Thus, I have
demonstrated that any animal whose nervous system has the capacity for centralized attention,
meets the first necessary condition set forth for animal self-consciousness, that being a complex
nervous system.
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CHAPTER 3
I have argued, so far, for three necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for selfconsciousness in animals. Those being: (1) a complex nervous system, (2) communication and (3)
collaborative social play. In this chapter I explore the second condition. I begin with a brief
overview of the suggestion that animal communication can be used as evidence of thinking, as the
motivation for what follows in this chapter. I go on to consider three accounts of what
communication consists in, in order to establish an account which points to the emergence of selfconsciousness. The first account of communication I consider is the biological account, which I
criticize on the basis that it is too permissive, and as such does not point to a sense of self. The
second account is information-based, which I criticize on the basis that it is silent on the nature
and content of animal minds. Here, it is helpful to note that an account’s indication of the nature
and content of animal minds is necessary for this project, which seeks to determine which animals
have a sense of self, that is, which animals are self-conscious. Next, I consider a third account,
known as the intentional account, which is largely concerned with the intention of a
communicative utterance. The intentional account provides a significant body of literature relevant
to how animals communicate their thoughts. With a focus on the Gricean approach to intentional
accounts of animal communication, I will use Juan Gómez’s interpretation to demonstrate that
intentional communication is formative of a sense of self, and as such self-consciousness. Thus,
any animal whose communicative utterance fits the intentional account, meets the second
condition set forth for animal self-consciousness.
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3.1 Why Animal Communication?
Philosopher Donald R. Griffin proposes that animal communication might be able to
provide a number of insights about the nature and content of animal minds (Griffin, 154). He states
that the mechanisms underlying animal communication exist as “a source of objective evidence
about the thoughts and feelings [of animals] that have previously seemed so inaccessible” (Griffin,
154). The basis of Griffin’s claim is that if animals have subjective thoughts and feelings, these
would likely be reflected in their communicative utterances (Griffin, 154). That is, if animals have
thoughts and feelings, one might assume it would be in their best interest to be able to share those
with others, as well as for the others to correctly understand them (Griffin, 154). So, it seems
animal communication can be evaluated as an exchange of thoughts and feeling between animals,
and the probability that this exchange might alter the nature or content of their minds. Given
Griffin’s claims, in this chapter I explore communication as the second condition required for
animal self-consciousness. I use Griffin’s notion that communication reflects the nature and
content of animal minds, such that if this includes a sense of self, the communicative utterance of
the animal meets the second condition for self-consciousness.

3.2 What is Animal Communication?
When one turns to a discussion of what animal communication is, one can observe multiple
paradigmatic instances of communication, and extract from them a general definition which points
to what they have in common. To start with, social insects communicate; honeybees are famous
for their waggle dance, which is used to indicate to other bees in the hive the exact location of
pollinating flowers (Von Frisch, 1967). Similarly, fish communicate. For example, electric fish
use electrical signals in both social and predator-prey interactions (Griffin, 154). Birds also
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communicate in a number of ways; chickens use a number of distinct calls and ravens “gesture
with their beaks and use eye contact to coordinate interactions with nonfood items such as twigs
or moss” (Andrews, 111). Finally, mammals communicate too. For example, baboons demonstrate
at least 14 distinct audible expressions with different meanings, while both prairie dogs and
meerkats also demonstrate “distinct alarm calls to warn group members about the appearance of
various predators” (Andrews, 111).
Philosopher Kristin Andrews claims that each of these instances highlight a shared aspect
of animal communication, namely that it involves the coordination of two or more animals
(Andrews, 111). However, Andrews also claims that, taken together, they point to another set of
questions about animal communication; “What else do they have in common? And how do they
differ? Are they all instances of the same kind of communication?” (Andrews, 111). In order to
answer these questions, one must establish an account of animal communication from which to
proceed. According to Andrews, there are three prominent accounts of communication, the
biological, the information-based and the intentional, each of which demonstrate a slightly
different understanding of animal communication, and which communicative utterances ought to
be encompassed in that conception. In what follows, I investigate those accounts in order to
articulate an account of animal communication that illuminates the nature and content of animal
minds. For the purpose of this project, I must establish an account of communication which
indicates that an animal has a sense of self, and as such self-consciousness.
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3.3 Accounts of Animal Communication
3.3.1 Biological Accounts
One account of animal communication is biological, in which communication is generally
thought of as “a relationship between two organisms such that a change in the state of one organism
causes a change in the state of the other organism” (Andrews, 112). Indeed, biologist Peter James
Slater claims that the very essence of communication is that the behavior of one animal influences
another’s behavior (Gómez, 62). However, this unrestricted account of communication lends itself
to being too permissive (Gómez, 62). For example, if animal A kicks animal B, and animal B’s
behavior changes in response to the kick, according to Slater’s account, this interaction would be
thought of as communicative. In order to avoid being too permissive, other biologists propose
accounts of communication which adopt additional criteria to that criterion of “influencing another
animal’s behavior” (Gomez, 62). For example, Richard Dawkins and John Krebs find that the
essence of communication is dependent on two criteria; (1) that the communicative behavior of
one animal results in a change of behavior or attitude in another animal, and (2) that this change
benefits the animal who originally exhibited the communicative behavior (Andrews, 112).
Nonetheless, even with the adoption of the additional criteria, biological accounts provide
minimal constraints on which behaviors or interactions are communicative. As a result, these
minimal constraints allow for simple behaviors to be determined to be communicative (Andrews,
112). For example, according to these accounts even a number of behaviors or interactions outside
of the animal kingdom would be communicative. Bean plants release an odorous substance which
attracts wasps, who in turn feed on small bugs that are infesting the plant (Andrews, 112). Further,
bean plants also send signals through their roots to neighboring plants, warning them of their
infestation, so that those plants can proactively release the sustenance (Andrews, 113). Thus,
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according to biological accounts the bean plants are communicating; the change in behavior of one
influences another. In addition to the minimal constraints provided by biological accounts which
“make the answer to the communication question too simple,” (Andrews, 113) these accounts also
provide nothing to the discussion of the nature and content of animal minds. That is, they make no
claims in regard to the notion “whether animals can communicate their thoughts,” (Andrews, 113)
and as such cannot be used in the determination of which animals have a sense of self, as to be
self-conscious.

3.3.2 Information Based Accounts
Another account of animal communication is information-based, where alternatively,
communication is thought of as “the exchange of information from one party to another”
(Andrews, 113). The information-based accounts of communication, first proposed by
mathematician Claude Shannon, claim that the message sent by one animal is simply an encoded
signal of information, which is decoded and reconstructed by another animal (Andrews, 113).
However, it is important to clarify that not every signal sent by an animal contains information,
such that information is defined as “a means of reducing uncertainty in the receiver” (Andrews,
113). That is, signals containing information must provide a representation of content which alters
the other’s perception and/or actions. Ruth Millikan refers to the simplest form of information
exchange as pushmi-pullyu representations (Millikan, 2006). In pushmi-pullyu representations, the
signal sent by an animal “simultaneously gives information about the situation and information
about how to respond to the situation” (Andrews, 114). For example, in the waggle dance,
honeybees depend on the specificity of movements in their dance to send information to other bees
in the hive the exact location of pollinating flowers, whose pollen is needed for the production of
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honey (Von Frisch, 1967). However, this is the same principle upon which computer systems
work. Given that “information-based accounts can include natural as well as artificial design;
artifacts and artificial systems such as computer networks can communicate as well” (Andrews,
114). Thus, just like the biological account, the information-based account of animal
communication provides no insight into the nature and content of animal minds and cannot be used
in the investigation of animal self-consciousness.

3.3.3 Intentional Accounts
Meanwhile, a third account of animal communication is intentional, in which
communication is “flexible, and requires expecting that another receives the message” (Andrews,
115). That is, according to this account, the communicative utterance of the animal is “intended to
have a communicative effect” (Gómez, 64). Here, intention is used in the sense that when the
animal sends a signal containing information, the animal is aware both of that information and the
effect sharing that information will have; “indeed this is why he or she uses the signal” (Gómez,
64). When distinguishing intentional from unintentional communication, it seems intentional
communication must always be partially referential and not simply emotive (Andrews, 123).
Biologist Peter Marler suggests that functionally referential utterances are those in which, “(1) the
production of the signal must be caused by the same kind of stimuli, and (2) hearing or seeing the
signal must cause the same effect as does hearing or seeing the object the signal refers to”
(Andrews, 124). For example, bantam chickens give two distinct alarm calls, one for aerial
predators and another for ground predators (Andrews, 124). Similarly, they exhibit two distinct
escape actions, one for aerial predators such as hawks, and another for ground predators such as
foxes. Yet, bantam chickens demonstrate the same escape action in response to a hawk, regardless
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of whether they saw the hawk themselves or if another chicken gave the aerial predator alarm call
(Andrews, 124).
Referential utterances, however, are not limited to alarm calls; in some cases, food calls,
social calls and contact calls meet Marler’s criteria as well. Contact calls, specifically, are
referential as they are representative of a particular individual (Andrews, 124). For example,
bottlenose dolphins “develop individually distinctive signature whistles that they use to maintain
group cohesion… [such that] signature whistles can facilitate continued contact between
individuals” (Janik et al., 2016). Dolphins within the pod learn to identify the signature whistle
and recognize it as representing that particular individual (Andrews, 125). Interestingly, dolphins
develop their signature whistle within the first few months of their lives, and while female dolphins
maintain a stable signature whistle, it seems males are able to modify theirs (Tyack, 1997;
Andrews, 125). Moreover, dolphins seem to have an incredible capacity for imitation, such that
they sometimes imitate another dolphin’s signature whistle to gain a response from the named
individual (Tyack, 1997; Andrews, 125). These features of the bottlenose dolphin signature
whistles point to referential properties, which are central to intentional accounts of animal
communication. Further, they indicate that intentional communication does, indeed, have
something to say about the nature and content of animal minds, and as such about the thoughts and
feelings of animals. Thus, the intentional account is an articulation of communication which can
be used in the investigation of which communicative utterances of an animal meet the second
condition set forth for self-consciousness. I elaborate on intentional accounts of animal
communication in what follows and aim to demonstrate how it is that intentional communication
results in a sense of self and meets the second condition for self-consciousness.

Bernewitz 40
3.4 Intentional Accounts: The Gricean Approach
Different approaches have been taken in the discussion of intentional communication, the
most influential of which is the Gricean approach. The Gricean approach stems from philosopher
H.P. Grice’s suggestion that when animals intentionally communicate with one another, they think
about what the other is thinking (Andrews, 115 and Gómez, 64). For example, if animal A
communicates X to animal B, animal A intends X to provoke a reaction in animal B, because
animal A believes animal B will understand X. Indeed, this brief example demonstrates the
Gricean approach to intentional communication, in which the signal of one animal is intended to
produce a response in another animal, such that the other animal recognizes the intention of the
signal, and this recognition of intention accounts for the other animal’s response to the signal
(Andrews, 115). Thus, the Gricean approach seems to depend on a sophisticated theory of mind
(TOM) (Andrews, 115). Indeed, philosopher Daniel Dennett claims that the Gricean approach to
intentional accounts of animal communication requires the animal to have a third-order intentional
system (Andrews, 116).
This stems from Dennett’s discussion of the different orders of intentional systems and the
way in which they ought to be conceived of, where:
A first-order intentional system has beliefs and desires (etc.) but no beliefs and
desires about beliefs and desires. Thus, all the attributions we make to a merely
first-order intentional system have the logical form of
7. x believes that p
8. y wants that q
where "p" and "q" are clauses that themselves contain no intentional idioms.
A second-order intentional system is more sophisticated; it has beliefs and desires
(and no doubt other intentional states) about beliefs and desires (and other
intentional states) - both those of others and its own. For instance
9. x wants y to believe that x is hungry
10. x believes y expects x to jump left
11. x fears that y will discover that x has a food cache
A third-order intentional system is one that is capable of such states as
12. x wants y to believe that x believes he is all alone. (Dennett, 1983)
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To summarize Dennett’s discussion above, a first-order intentional system has beliefs and desires,
a second-order intentional system has beliefs and desires about those beliefs and desires, while a
third-order intentional account has beliefs and desires about the second order beliefs and desires.
Through the consideration of those conceptions, it becomes evident why, according to Dennett,
the Gricean approach to communication requires a third-order intentional system. Recall that in
the Gricean approach when animals intentionally communicate with one another, they think about
what the other is thinking (Andrews, 115; Gómez, 64). Animals with first-order intentional
systems have no beliefs about beliefs, and so lack the ability to think about what the other is
thinking; while animals with second-order intentional systems lack the ability think about their
desire for the other to think about their intention. So, only animals with third-order intentional
systems have “the ability to think about the beliefs others have about one’s own beliefs,”
(Andrews, 116) as to fit the standard of the Gricean approach to intentional communication.

3.5 The Gricean Approach to Intentional Communication and Mutual Awareness in Animals
One interpretation of the Gricean approach, which follows from the belief that it requires
a third-order intentional system, is that intentional communication involves mutual awareness,
occurring between the speaker and the listener (Gómez, 68). It is important to note, that this mutual
awareness is an awareness of the other’s mental processes, not merely the other’s presence during
the communicative interaction (Gómez, 68). As such, it is “an awareness of the other’s awareness”
(Gómez, 68). Gómez claims that this mutual awareness stems from attention contact, which can
be understood as the mutual recognition of the other’s signs of attention (Gómez, 73-76).
Accordingly, attention contact consists of animal A attending to the signs of attention of animal
B, while animal B is attending to the signs of attention of animal A at the same time. Gómez notes
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this follows a peculiar Gricean structure (Gómez, 72). One compelling way to show attention
contact is through eye contact, in which one animal attends the other’s eyes, checks their attention
and becomes aware of the object or being that is the focus of the other’s attention (Gómez, 72).
However, attention contact is not reducible to eye contact, such that there are other signs of
attention including mirroring, mimicry, etc. Thus, “insofar as we admit that the signs of attention
are signs of awareness, they can be said to be aware of each other’s awareness” (Gómez, 76).
Gómez goes on to state that when two animals are intentionally communicating, they not
only “think of each other thinking of each other; they perceive each other attending to each other”
(Gómez, 76). That is, when two animals are in attention contact, they perceive each other’s
attention rather than merely thinking of each other’s attention; such that the mutual awareness
which occurs is perceptual, not intellectual (Gómez, 76). This indicates that the attention of one
animal can be mediated through its perception of the focus of attention of the other. For example,
chimpanzees are able to discover hidden food through their perception of the focus of attention of
a leader, who knows where the food is hidden (Gómez, 76). The result of this interpretation is a
particularly interesting one, such that if the focus of attention of the other is on an animal’s own
attention, the other’s attention points to an animals’ own attentional activity (Gómez, 76). This is
what occurs in attention contact, thereby “the structure of attentional contact seems to lead to a
first version of self-awareness (both as a physical and as an “aware” or “attending” entity)”
(Gómez, 76). Ultimately, Gómez claims that the Gricean approach to intentional communication,
which involves attention contact, implies “a sophisticated combination of self- and otherawareness” (Gómez, 68).

Bernewitz 43
3.6 The Gricean Approach to Intentional Communication and Self-Consciousness
The above claim, that attention contact might allow for the emergence of more complex
versions of self- and other- awareness, follows the structure of G.H. Mead’s and Vygotsky’s ideas
(Gómez, 77). The structure of their ideas is that a sense of self is mediated through the other, but
of course Gómez takes it a step further, that a sense of self is mediated through the awareness of
the other’s attention (Gómez, 77). That is, “the ability to understand the other’s attention or
awareness would lead to the ability to understand one’s own awareness” (Gómez, 77). Thus, it is
through the mutual awareness that occurs in intentional communication, that this mediation of a
sense of self through the awareness of the other arises. Recall that this mutual awareness stems
from attention contact, (Gómez, 76) which is the mutual recognition of the other’s signs of
attention (Gómez, 73). Indeed, Gómez himself claims that “when we analyze the implications of
attention contact, it seems that many important later developments are embedded in its structure
[including] self-consciousness” (Gómez, 77). However, Gómez is also careful to point out that one
should not succumb to developmental fallacy, the assumption that the identification of a simple
situation whose structure implies a later situation provides an explanation for the emergence of the
latter (Gómez, 77). So, as to avoid developmental fallacy, one cannot claim that because attention
contact implies self-consciousness, this accounts for the mechanism of realization for selfconsciousness (Gómez, 77). One can, however, claim that attention contact “seems to be the key
to the Gricean structure of intentional communication … moreover, attention contact seems to be
a seminal situation for the development of self-consciousness” (Gómez, 78). Thereby, intentional
communication points to the emergence of a sense of self, and as such self-consciousness.
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3.7 Conclusion
In sum, I have demonstrated that the intentional account of communication provides an
understanding of the communicative utterances of animals that points to a sense of self, and as
such self-consciousness. In this chapter, I found that animal communication can be used as
evidence of thinking; and that any account of communication which is employed in the
investigation animal self-consciousness must indicate that the nature and content of animal minds
includes a sense of self. I found that both the biological and information-based accounts fail to do
so: the biological account is too permissive, while the information-based account is silent on the
nature and content of animal minds more generally. However, I found the intentional account does
point to a sense of self, as it is largely concerned with the intention of a communicative utterance
and how animals communicate their thoughts. Indeed, according to the Gricean approach to
intentional communication, when animals intentionally communicate with one another they think
about what the other is thinking. Thus, using Gómez’s claim that intentional communication is
formative of a sense of self, I argued that intentional communication points to animal selfconsciousness. Thus, I have demonstrated that any animal who communicative utterance fits the
intentional account, meets the second condition set forth for animal self-consciousness.
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CHAPTER 4
Throughout this project, I have argued for three necessary and jointly sufficient conditions
for self-consciousness in animals. Those being: (1) a complex nervous system, (2) communication
and (3) collaborative social play. In this chapter I explore the third condition. I begin with a
reference to the notion that animal social play can be used to investigate the nature and content of
animal minds. Specifically, I focus on the notion that animal social play can be used to make
inferences about an animals’ sense of self, and as such the emergence of self-consciousness. Next,
I investigate how animal social play ought to be defined and focus on Bekoff and Beyer’s (1981)
definition which makes no reference to functionality. Using this definition, I go on to consider how
social play can be systematically studied through Colin Allen’s proposal for the attribution of
concepts to animal and consider animals’ use of play signals to differentiate instances of play from
instances of non-play. I then investigate two different forms of animal social play, those being selfhandicapping and role reversal, both of which have traditionally been approached as indications
of an understanding of self. Thus, any animal who exhibits self-handicapping and role-reversal,
meets the third condition set forth for animal self-consciousness.

4.1 Why Animal Social Play?
Philosophers Colin Allen and Marc Bekoff propose that although there are a number of
collaborative behaviors in the animal kingdom that can be examined, collaborative social play, in
particular, might be useful in gaining insight into animal minds (Allen and Bekoff, 88-89). Allen
and Bekoff claim that the empirical investigation of collaborative social play [hereafter: social
play] yields more significant evidence about the nature and content of animal minds than other
behaviors. This is because investigation of social play primarily focuses on behavioral patterns,
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such as cooperation and role-playing, which indicate what is going on “in there” (Allen and Bekoff,
88). Allen and Bekoff also suggest that behavioral patterns of social play occur across a number
of animal species, and as such lend themselves to the extension of investigation “beyond the
narrow focus on primates that often dominates discussions of nonhuman cognition” (Allen and
Bekoff, 88). They state, “it would be premature to rule out the possibility that the performance of
these behavior patterns might also be important in the evolution of self-conception in nonprimates” (Allen and Bekoff, 89). That is, social play seems to point to behavioral patterns from
which inferences about the emergence of consciousness and self-consciousness can be made
(Allen and Bekoff, 89; Bekoff, 1999). Given Allen and Bekoff’s claims, in this chapter I explore
social play as the third condition required for animal self-consciousness.

4.2 What is Animal Social Play?
When one turns to a discussion of what social play is, it seems there is no simple or unique
definition. Social play refers to a number of behavioral patterns across animal species, and as such
is similar to feeding and mating. However, “unlike play, feeding and mating correspond to easily
identified biological functions” (Allen and Bekoff, 89). Thus, what is unique about social play is
that it does not have a distinct biological function. Some propose that social play might contribute
to the improvement of the general skill set of young animals, such that play might contribute to
the development of motor and cognitive capabilities (Allen and Bekoff, 90). Others propose that
social play might result in improving hunting, foraging and social abilities, all of which are
beneficial to the animal across its lifespan (Allen and Bekoff, 90). Furthermore, there are other
who propose that play “may have different evolved functions in different species and it may have
different consequences for individuals of different ages and sexes” (Allen and Bekoff, 90). Thus,
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functional definitions of play “are difficult to formulate … [and some] authors have been tempted
into defining it as a functionless behavior” (Allen and Bekoff, 89-90).
Indeed, in an attempt to provide a definition that makes no reference to functionality,
Bekoff and Beyers conceive of play in the following way:
Play is all motor activity performed postnatally that appears to be purposeless, in
which motor patterns from other contexts may often be used in modified forms and
altered temporal sequencing. If the activity is directed toward another living being
is called social play. (Bekoff and Beyers, 1981).
Bekoff claims this definition “centers on the structure of play sequences – what animals do when
they play – and not on possible functions of play” (Bekoff, 1999). The structure of play sequences
varies greatly within and between species of animals, such that the next action in play sequences
can rarely be accurately predicted; although, “the degree of variability can be affected by the ages
of participants, their sexes, their social ranks, their social experience, etc.” (Allen and Bekoff, 91).
This flexibility and variability among play sequences allows for the study of social play to be
particularly interesting.

4.3 Studying Animal Social Play
Bekoff suggests that the study of social play or play sequences is suitable to Allen’s
proposal for the attribution of concepts to animals (Bekoff, 1999). According to Allen’s proposal:
An organism O may reasonably be attributed a concept of X whenever: (1) O
systematically discriminates some instances of X from some non-Xs; (2) O is
capable of detecting some of its own discrimination errors between Xs and non-Xs;
and (3) O is capable of learning to better discriminate Xs from non-Xs as a
consequence of its capacity. (Bekoff, 1999)
For the purpose of this project, the concept X of interest, which can be attributed to an organism
O, is play. Bekoff suggests that canids, especially coyotes, might be used to demonstrate Allen’s
proposal. In regard to the first point, coyotes seem to be able to systematically discriminate some
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instances of play from some instances of non-play by the kind of bites involved in the play
sequence (Bekoff, 1999). During social play, “bites directed toward the tail, a flank, a leg, the
abdomen, or the back lasted a significantly shorter time and were more stereotyped… than during
aggression” (Allen and Bekoff, 98). Coyotes are able to recognize the subtle differences in bite
timing in order to discriminate instances of play from instances of non-play. With respect to the
second point, many animals, such as coyotes, are able to identify when they have misidentified an
instance of play as non-play and vice versa, as exemplified by their use of the play bow which will
be explored further in the next section (Bekoff, 1999). Finally, in regard to the third point, animals
seem to become better at discriminating between play and non-play through previous mistakes of
discrimination (Bekoff, 1999). Through the consideration of Allen’s proposal, it seems the next
question which must be addressed in relation to animal social play is: how do animals agree to
play? This question is particularly significant within the context of this project, as the agreement
to play points to a sense of self. That is, the agreement is dependent on an animal’s ability to
distinguish between self and other, as well as grasp what the relationship is between self and other
during the interaction.

4.4 Play Signals: How do Animals Agree to Play?
As seen above with coyotes and the discrimination of bites in play and non-play, when
animals engage in social play, they use behavioral patterns within the play sequence which are
also used across other contexts (Bekoff, 1999). If the behavioral patterns within the play sequence
are not intrinsically different from predatory, antipredatory or mating contexts, then how do
animals agree to play (Allen and Bekoff, 99)? Many animals have evolved play signals, or play
markers, which are used to reach an agreement to play and to maintain a playful mood throughout
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the interaction (Allen and Bekoff, 99; Bekoff, 1999). Bekoff claims “play-soliciting signals appear
to foster some sort of cooperation between players so that each responds to the other in a way
consistent with play” (Allen and Bekoff, 99). Here, coyotes can be used once again as an example.
Coyotes react differently to threatening gestures, such as biting and standing over, following a play
signal compared to in the absence of a play signal (Allen and Bekoff, 99).

4.4.1 Play Bows
One oft cited and extensively studied example of a play signal is the canid play bow, which
is “a highly ritualized and stereotyped movement that seems to function to stimulate recipients to
engage (or to continue to engage) in social play” (Allen and Bekoff, 99). The notion that play bows
are stereotyped implies that the way in which they are performed is highly uniform, however, it
does not imply that play bows are not versatile (Allen and Bekoff, 100). This uniformity is
important for the purpose of play bows, such that in this way they are less likely to be misidentified
(Allen and Bekoff, 100). During a play bow, “an individual crouches on its forelimbs, remains
standing on its hind legs, and may wag its tail and bark… [this] places the head of the bower below
the head of another animal in an unthreatening position” (Allen and Bekoff, 100). Play bows
“occur almost exclusively during social play” (Bekoff, 1999) and can occur at any point in the play
sequence, although they most commonly occur at the beginning of the sequence (Bekoff, 1999).
While the form of play bows if highly uniform, dependent on when they occur in the play sequence,
their duration is quite versatile. Allen and Bekoff claim this can be attributed to three explanations,
(1) that fatigue occurs during play; (2) the performance of preceding postures; and (3) that there is
less necessity to signal the continuation of play than the initiation of play (Allen and Bekoff, 100).
One should note that they do not believe these explanations are mutually exclusive (Allen and
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Bekoff, 100). Regardless of the explanations for the versatility of play bows during play sequences,
it does seem that play bows in general reinforce and maintain the play mood of the interaction
(Allen and Bekoff, 103). That is, play bows signal to the other “I want to play… what follows is
play… [and] this is still play” (Bekoff, 1999), thus allowing for the cooperation between animals
during social play.

4.5 Forms of Animal Social Play
4.5.1 Self-Handicapping
One behavior pattern which is commonly identified during animal social play is selfhandicapping (Bekoff, 1999). Self-handicapping is a behavior in which one animal purposefully
inhibits itself during the interaction in order to foster the play mood (Bekoff, 1999; Essler et al.,
2016). Interestingly, self-handicapping does not take into account the “the relative ranks of the
partners outside of the play context” (Essler et al., 2016); both the dominant and subordinate
animals might demonstrate self-handicapping during social play. In general, there are three kinds
of self-handicapping observed in the animal kingdom, “social self-handicapping, when a stronger
partner takes a disadvantageous position, kinematic self-handicapping, when a partner exhibits a
physically demanding position, and sensory self-handicapping, when a partner closes its eyes
while acting” (Essler et al., 2016). Once again, coyotes can be used to demonstrate selfhandicapping behavior. During social play, “a coyote might not bite her play partner as hard as she
can, or she might not play as vigorously as she can” (Bekoff, 1999). Here, when the coyote does
not bite with all of its force, or does not play as vigorously as possible, it demonstrates selfhandicapping by taking a disadvantageous position. This, in turn, encourages the play partner to
continue the interaction in the play mood. Similarly, red neck wallabies seem to demonstrate self-
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handicapping, such that they adjust the way in which they play depending on their play partner’s
age (Bekoff, 1999). For example, “when a partner was younger, the older animal adopted a
defensive, flat-footed posture… [and] was more tolerant of its partners tactics” (Bekoff, 1999).

4.5.2 Role Reversal and Self-Handicapping/Role Reversal Combinations
Another behavior pattern which is commonly identified during animal social play is role
reversal (Bekoff, 1999). In role reversal, “a dominant animal performs an action during play that
would not normally occur during real aggression” (Bekoff, 1999). A good example of role reversal
can be observed when companion dogs play with one another. The role reversal occurs when the
dominant dog rolls over to expose its belly voluntarily, which it would not do outside of the context
of play (Bekoff, 1999; Smuts, 2014). Indeed, for dogs, rolling over belly up is one of the most
vulnerable positions they can be in; by doing so voluntarily, the dominant dog demonstrates their
subordinate position to the play partner (Smuts, 2014). Similarly, in coyote pups rolling over is
demonstrated as role reversal, where rolling over of the dominant coyote pup occurs exclusively
in social play contexts (Bekoff, 1999). Yet role reversal and self-handicapping are not entirely
exclusive; there are some instances in which they occur within the same play sequence (Bekoff,
1999). For example, the dominant animal might roll over to expose its belly voluntarily, as well as
not bite their play partner with all of its force (Bekoff, 1999).
Together, these forms of animal social play occur “as not to allow the interaction to escalate
into a real fight” (Bekoff, 1999). Recall, that the behavior patterns in play sequences are not unique
to play contexts, therefore “play sequences are punctuated with behaviors patterns that indicate an
individual is willing to either handicap himself or engage in role playing” (Bekoff, 1999). This
willingness points towards the animals’ wish to play, and as such might provide insight into the
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nature and content of its mind (Bekoff, 1999). Indeed, Bekoff finds “the performance of selfhandicapping and role reversal suggests that an individual is able to make an assessment of himself
and others and manage or regulate how she plays” (Bekoff, 1999). If Bekoff’s interpretation is
correct, then the performance of these two forms of social play require that the animal has a sense
of self and is able to distinguish itself from other. Similarly, Maxeen Biben suggests that
collaborative social play is used by individuals to “learn strategies of social interaction that are
related to self-competence and self-preservation” (Bekoff, 1999). Again, here, it becomes evident
that there is a distinct relationship between social play and a sense of self.

4.6 Conclusion
In sum, I have demonstrated that self-handicapping and role-reversal in animal play
sequences point towards a sense of self, and as such self-consciousness. In this chapter, I found
that collaborative social play [again hereafter: social play] might be useful in gaining insight into
animal minds; and that social play points to behavioral patterns from which inferences about
animal self-consciousness can be made. Indeed, social play is a particularly interesting behavior
because it is not directly tied to a biological function. Using Bekoff’s notion that play signals,
specifically play bows, allow for animals to agree or continue to agree to play, I argued that there
are two forms of social play of particular interest when investigating animal self-consciousness,
those being self-handicapping and role-reversal. Recall, that in self-handicapping one animal
purposefully inhibits itself during the interaction in order to foster the play mood, while rolereversal the dominant animal performs an action it would not usually perform in an aggressive
encounter. I found that both of these forms of social play require than an animal have a sense of
self, and as such self-consciousness, because they presume an ability to distinguish between self
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and other. Thus, I have demonstrated that any animal who exhibits self-handicapping and rolereversal, meets the third condition set forth for animal self-consciousness.
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CHAPTER 5
In this project, I have demonstrated why (1) a complex nervous system, (2) communication
and (3) collaborative social play, are each individually necessary for animal self-consciousness. In
this chapter, I aim to demonstrate that together they are sufficient, such that the three conditions
must be understood as necessary and jointly sufficient for self-consciousness. To do so, I
investigate some of the traditional criticisms against each of the conditions individually. I then find
that by treating them as jointly sufficient, my proposal overcomes these criticisms; thereby
providing a new set of conditions which are successful in determining which animals are and are
not self-conscious. In anticipation of possible objections to my proposal more generally, I turn to
philosopher Valerie Hardcastle’s response to explanatory gap arguments and view of scientific
explanations. Hardcastle claims it is not fair to demand that scientific explanations demonstrate
why an identification or identity statement holds. Indeed, Hardcastle finds that demonstration of
the identification is explanation enough for scientific theory, a notion I embrace to address the
following questions:
1. What is the connection between these three conditions and self-consciousness?
2. Why is it that these three conditions give rise to self-consciousness?
3. Why are these three conditions necessary and jointly sufficient for self-consciousness?
Finally, I provide a demonstration of how my proposal can be implemented through the
consideration of dolphins as a case example of an animal which meets all three conditions set forth
in my proposal and is self-conscious.

5.1 Criticisms Against the First Condition: A Complex Nervous System
As seen in the second chapter, I argue that centralized attention, the third stage in the
evolution of the nervous system, is adequately complex for the emergence of animal selfconsciousness. Recall this is because centralized attention demonstrates the functional
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organization between neurons required to process signals in a meaningful way; and that selfconsciousness is dependent on this meaning. In short, to demonstrate that centralized attention
meets the first condition for animal self-consciousness, I employ the complexity argument.
However, in his book Rethinking Consciousness, neuroscientist Michael Graziano discusses the
traditional criticism of the complexity argument. Graziano states:
Scholars who write about the evolution of consciousness tend to emphasize a
gradual increase in the complexity of the brain. It is intuitively tempting to think
that complexity makes consciousness. In that view, somewhere in the process of
evolution, the nervous system became so complex that it crossed a threshold, woke
up, and gained subjectivity. If that is true, then the question of consciousness turns
into a matter of finding the threshold – always a slippery slope. (Graziano, 36)
In this passage, Graziano elegantly describes the complexity argument: the argument claims that
at some stage in the evolution of the nervous system there is a threshold at which consciousness,
or self-consciousness, arises as a result of an adequate complexity of the nervous system (again,
this is the argument I make in the second chapter). He also describes the traditional criticism of
this argument: finding this threshold for consciousness, or self-consciousness, is always
problematic (Graziano, 36).
Graziano attributes the problematic nature of finding this threshold to human emotional
biases (Graziano, 37). For example, if one rules out fish as being conscious because one assumes
their nervous system lacks complexity, perhaps an expert in the realm of fish nervous systems
would find that this assumption is mistaken; that fish do have the necessary complexity, and so
that they are indeed conscious (Graziano, 36-37). Thus, Graziano claims that the threshold for
consciousness, and self-consciousness, is always “subject to human whim” (Graziano, 37).
Following this, Graziano states:
Once you start with the intuition that consciousness arises naturally from complex
information processing, it’s hard not to slip into panpsychism, the belief that
everything in the universe is conscious at least to some degree. By replacing
consciousness with information and complexity, properties that are literally
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everywhere and in everything, we are left to slide up and down the slippery scale.
(Graziano, 37)
Given this criticism, one might wonder why I maintain that a complex nervous system is the first
condition for animal self-consciousness. I believe that a complex nervous system is nonetheless
necessary, although not sufficient for self-consciousness, such that the other two conditions
prevent the slip into panpsychism Graziano is concerned about. Indeed, a complex nervous system
is necessary for self-consciousness for a very simple reason. It provides an internal control system
which “depicts the self as containing an amorphous, non-physical, internal power, an ability to
know, to experience, and to respond” (Graziano, 43). Furthermore, it provides an animal with the
“requisite information to lay claim to a subjective experience, [and so self-consciousness] finally
becomes relevant” (Graziano, 44). Thus, for self-consciousness to become relevant, it seems a
complex nervous system certainly is necessary, although only sufficient in the simultaneous
occurrence with the other two conditions, communication and collaborative social play.

5.2 Criticisms Against the Second and Third Conditions: Communication and Social Play
As seen in the third chapter, I argue that communication as described by the intentional
account is seminal to the emergence of self-consciousness. Recall that the Gricean approach to
intentional communication finds that when animals intentionally communicate with one another,
they think about what the other is thinking. Indeed, Gómez’s interpretation of the Gricean approach
emphasizes a mutual awareness and attention contact which points to a sense of self, and as such
self-consciousness. In short, to demonstrate that intentional communication meets the second
condition for animal self-consciousness, I argue that communicative utterances can be used to
make inferences about a sense of self. However, the notion of depending on the nature of
communicative utterances as a means of inference for animal self-consciousness has traditionally
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met certain criticisms and is often discouraged by cognitive ethologists. Cognitive ethologists
follow a tradition in which there is a “conviction that all animal communication is a direct result
of internal physiological states that are not under any sort of conscious control” (Griffin, 155).
That is, they do not believe communication provides insight into the nature and content of animal
minds, and so they claim it cannot be used to infer animal self-consciousness. Another related
criticism stems from the view that the communicative utterances of animals might merely be
“predictive information that leads to an appropriate response on the part of the animal” (Griffin,
155). This criticism supposes that animals communicate in a manner that does not indicate whether
they are or are not conscious of their utterance; and that instead, they communicate in a manner
that suggests they are merely simple, behaviorist organisms (Griffin, 155).
The above criticisms against using communicative utterances to make inferences about
self-consciousness, are quite similar to the criticisms against using collaborative social play for the
same purpose. Recall that in the fourth chapter, I argue the two most commonly observed forms
of animal social play, self-handicapping and role reversal, can be used to infer self-consciousness.
That is, self-handicapping and role reversal reflect an animal’s ability to monitor its own sense of
self, as well as the ability to distinguish self from other. Oft-cited criticisms against this inference
focus on the following question: how can one be certain that animals are in any way aware of the
meaning of the play sequence or “are they simply conditioned to respond” (Bekoff, 1999)? Thus,
given these criticisms, one might again wonder why I maintain that communication and
collaborative social play are the second and third conditions for animal self-consciousness. Just as
in the discussion of the first condition, I believe that communication and social play are necessary,
although individually not sufficient for self-consciousness. Indeed, the presence of an audience in
communication and the presence of a play partner in social play show that animals are not merely
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conditioned to respond (Griffin, 155); and instead, that the communication and social play of
animals operates from an ability to distinguish self from other. Thus, for self-consciousness to
become relevant, it seems communication and collaborative social play are necessary and
sufficient in the simultaneous occurrence with the first condition, a complex nervous system.

5.3 Three Conditions: Necessary and Jointly Sufficient
In the two preceding sections, I have addressed several potential criticisms against each of
the three conditions proposed for self-consciousness. I have also offered an argument against each
of the potential criticisms to demonstrate that each condition individually is necessary for selfconsciousness. However, each condition alone is not sufficient. That is, these conditions must
occur for the emergence of self-consciousness, but their occurrence alone does not guarantee selfconsciousness; they are only sufficient when then occur simultaneously. As jointly sufficient
conditions, if an animal meets all three conditions, one may conclude that the animal is selfconsciousness. Likewise, if an animal is assumed to be self-conscious, one may conclude that it
meets all three conditions. To demonstrate the necessary and jointly sufficient nature of the
conditions, it might be helpful to consider what form this would take. Let N represent the first
condition – a complex nervous system. Let C represent the second condition – communication.
And let P represent the third condition – collaborative social play. If animal X exhibits N alone,
although N is necessary for self-consciousness, one may conclude that animal X is not selfconscious. Similarly, if animal X exhibits C and P, although both C and P are individually
necessary for self-consciousness, one may conclude that animal X is still not self-conscious.
However, if animal X exhibits N, C and P, because these three conditions are individually
necessary and jointly sufficient, one may conclude that animal X is self-conscious. In the same
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way, if animal X is self-conscious, then one may conclude that it meets N, C and P; animal X
would not exhibit only a subset of those conditions. Thus, I arrive at an identity statement in my
proposal for self-consciousness, namely self-consciousness is N + C + P, and N + C + P is selfconsciousness.

5.4 Hardcastle and Explanatory Gap Arguments
In this project, I have taken recourse to a highly empirical approach in developing a theory
of animal self-consciousness, culminating in the following identity statement: self-consciousness
= a complex nervous system + communication + collaborative social play. In this way, I follow
philosopher Valerie Hardcastle who is a committed materialist in the study of consciousness
(Hardcastle, 1996). Hardcastle believes “that consciousness is part of the natural world, but surely
is completely mysterious” (Hardcastle, 1996). Hardcastle also believes that the best approach to
the study of consciousness is an empirical one, “to isolate the causal influences or components
with respect to consciousness and model them” (Hardcastle, 1996). This is what I have done in
this project; I have isolated the three conditions or components of self-consciousness, those being
(1) a complex nervous system, (2) communication and (3) collaborative social play. Indeed, this
is how I arrived at the identity statement that self-consciousness = a complex nervous system +
communication + collaborative social play, or self-consciousness = N + C + P. However, a
philosopher who demands more out of a theory of consciousness might find that my theory is
incomplete; while I have successfully identified the components of self-consciousness, I have not
explained why it is that N + C + P give rise to self-consciousness or why this identity holds
(Hardcastle, 1996). That is, I have not bridged the explanatory gap that exists between mind and
body. Hardcastle states the following:
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[This] is, of course, exactly right: scientific theories of consciousness won’t explain
the weirdness of consciousness to those who find the identity weird… To put it
bluntly: their failure to appreciate the world as it really is cuts no ice with science.
Their ideas are at fault, not the scientific method. Materialists presume that there is
some sort of identity statement for consciousness. (Hardcastle, 1996).
Given that the scientific method is not at fault, Hardcastle claims it would be a mistake to require
that scientific explanation, or theory of self-consciousness for the purpose of this project, is able
to explain why the identity statement holds. For example, other identity statements in science, such
as water = H2O, are not required to provide explanation, they are simply accepted (Hardcastle,
1996). Thus, I follow Hardcastle’s idea and claim that it would be unfair to require an explanation
of why self-consciousness = N + C + P, it is simply so. All one can propose to explain is that the
“understanding of consciousness [and as such self-consciousness] will someday be embedded in
some larger mind-brain framework” (Hardcastle, 1996).

5.5 Application of the Three Conditions
Here, it would be helpful to demonstrate how my proposal can be applied to determine
whether an animal is or is not self-conscious. For this purpose, I turn to dolphins as an example of
an animal which meets all three conditions set forth in my proposal for animal self-consciousness.
In the second chapter, I demonstrated that any animal whose nervous system has the capacity for
centralized attention, meets the first condition for self-consciousness: a complex nervous system.
Recall that centralized attention is characterized by multimodal signal integration. The dolphin
brain has two cerebral hemispheres which are connected by the corpus collosum, a bundle of
nerves that transmit signals across hemispheres for central integration (Leatherwood and Reeves,
1990). Furthermore, much like the human brain, the dolphin brain is made up of various lobes with
specialized functions: the sensory cortex maps physiological stimuli, while different layers in the
visual cortex map different kinds of visual stimuli (light, orientation, color, etc.) (Leatherwood and
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Reeves, 1990). The stimuli mapped in each hemisphere and lobe are then centrally integrated, as
is characteristic of centralized attention. Thus, I find that dolphins meet the first condition, as their
nervous system has the capacity for centralized attention.
Meanwhile, in the third chapter, I demonstrated that any animal whose communicative
utterance fits the intentional account of communication, meets the second condition for selfconsciousness: communication. Although I already examined the communicative utterances of
dolphins in the third chapter, it is worth reiterating, here, why they fit the intentional account. At
an early age, dolphins develop a signature whistle, which other dolphins in the pod learn to identify
and recognize as representing that individual (Andrews, 125). Dolphins use these signature
whistles along with other clicks and whistles to maintain group cohesion, and to communicate
important information to others about their location, or the location of food or a threat (Tyack,
1997). As the communicative utterances of dolphins contain referential properties, are intended to
have an effect and are about something, these utterances fit the intentional account. Therefore, I
find that dolphins meet the second condition for self-consciousness, such that their communicative
utterances are intentional.
Finally, in the fourth chapter, I demonstrated that any animal who exhibits selfhandicapping and role-reversal, meets the third condition set forth: collaborative social play.
Dolphins often exemplify self-handicapping and role-reversal in various play sequences, such play
fights or chases, play feeding and wave riding (Janik, 2015). Indeed, in the article Why do Dolphins
Play, Stand Kuczaj and Holli Eskelinen observe the following:
During social play, an older and/or more adept animal [dolphin] may opt to
handicap itself to both encourage playful interactions with a younger animal and to
avoid injuring the youngster. If the dolphins are playing a social game, such as
playfighting or play-mating, the more dominant animal may play a subordinate role,
such role reversals being rarely observed outside of the play context. (Kuczaj and
Eskelinen, 2014)
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Self-handicapping is particularly common during play fights and chases, in which dolphins
charge through the water at one another without harming one another (Janik, 2015). Meanwhile,
during play feeding, older and younger dolphins alternate hunting positions as an example of
role-reversal (Janik, 2015). I again find that dolphins meet the third condition set forth, such that
they demonstrate both self-handicapping and role-reversal during social play. Ultimately,
because dolphins meet all three conditions set forth, I conclude that they are self-conscious.
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CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this project, I have developed a theory of animal self-consciousness which provides a
means of distinguishing between animals which are and are not self-conscious. I have proposed
that there are three conditions which are necessary and jointly sufficient for animal selfconsciousness, those being: (1) a complex nervous system, (2) communication, and (3)
collaborative social play. I have found that these conditions are each individually necessary and
jointly sufficient, such that if an animal meets all three conditions, they are self-conscious.
Likewise, if an animal is self-conscious, they necessarily meet all three conditions. But one might
wonder, does it really matter whether any animal is self-conscious? Similarly, does it matter which
animals are self-conscious and under which conditions (Griffin, 234)? In an important sense I
believe the answer to those questions is yes. Indeed, there are three reasons why I believe one
ought to concern oneself with animal self-consciousness.
The first reason stems from philosophical curiosity, where “an understanding of animal
minds [and self-consciousness], presumably would inform the understanding of our own” (Vitti,
2010). In this way, the philosophical importance of animal self-consciousness “lies in its relevance
to the general question of other minds and difficult questions of how to define and identify
consciousness” (Griffin, 233). Indeed, questions about consciousness and self-consciousness often
stem from philosophical attempts to locate humans in nature (“Animal Consciousness,” 2016), and
are rooted in the notion that humans are distinct from other animals (Vitti, 2010). In the traditional
philosophical sense, at least in the West, that which distinguishes humans from other animals is
the uniquely human endowment of consciousness and self-consciousness (“Animal
Consciousness,” 2016). However, my proposal expands the endowment of self-consciousness to
other animals. Thus, through the careful consideration of animal self-consciousness and the
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reasonable conditions for its emergence, this project contributes to philosophical discourse about
consciousness and other minds more generally.
The second reason why one ought to concern oneself with animal self-consciousness stems
from ethical concerns that surround animal suffering. For example, “hardly anyone denies that
there is a large ethical difference between torturing a dog or monkey and mutilating even the most
elaborate and efficient machine” (Griffin, 245). This is rooted in the belief that animals consciously
suffer in a way that machines do not, that is, this is painful to me. So, it seems we frequently make
value judgements about animal suffering that inform our decisions about trade-offs concerning
welfare (Griffin, 246). Take two extreme cases: one in which a promising medical procedure is
tested on an anesthetized rat and to another in which an elephant is left crippled because it is hunted
for ivory (Griffin, 251). While the former trade-off seems warranted because human benefit is
greater than animal suffering (although that itself is debatable too), the latter is certainly an
“unwarranted indulgence in minor human satisfaction at the expense of considerable suffering”
(Griffin, 251). Yet most cases do not necessarily align with either extreme. Thus, the question
remains: “how should we actually implement change to accommodate conscious [or selfconscious] animals” (Vitti, 2010). Although I cannot hope to resolve this rather complex, but
immensely important issue here; this project, in its expansion of the endowment of selfconsciousness to other animals, contributes to ethical considerations of animal suffering.
Meanwhile, the third and final reason why I believe one ought to concern oneself with
animal self-consciousness stems from its scientific significance. Within the animal kingdom there
are millions of species of non-human animals, indeed:
For this alone it is important to understand animals as fully as possible; for without
such understanding we will remain blind to an important aspect of reality. We
cannot understand animal fully without know what their subjective experience are
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like… In its own right, [this is] an important reason to inquire as deeply and
critically as we can into the subjects discussed [animals]. (Griffin, 252)
Within the passage the relevance of scientific curiosity into animal self-consciousness becomes
evident, such that non-human animals comprise the majority of animal kingdom and ought to be
fully understood. Further, “much of twentieth-century science has gradually slipped into an
attitude that belittles nonhuman animals” (Griffin, 252). Through its expansion of the endowment
of self-consciousness to other animals, this project actively functions to counteract this slip in
scientific literature.
Ultimately, I am confident that my proposal of the three necessary and jointly sufficient
conditions for animal self-consciousness, those being (1) a complex nervous system, (2)
communication and (3) collaborative social play, contributes to philosophical, ethical and
scientific investigations of consciousness more generally. Indeed, I believe in its expansion of the
endowment of self-consciousness beyond humans to other animals, it is a continuation of a longterm learning and change in perspective away from a human-centric view to something much more
diverse and inclusive. In this way, this project moves away from a perspective of human singularity
and exceptionalism, and lays the groundwork for an inclusive investigation into questions
including the following: what it is like to be animal X and how one ought to go about animal
welfare with the knowledge that animal X is self-conscious?

Bernewitz 66
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Allen, Colin, and Marc Bekoff. Species of Mind: The Philosophy and Biology of Cognitive
Ethology. First Edition, The MIT Press, 1997.
Allen, Colin, and Michael Trestman. “Animal Consciousness.” The Blackwell Companion to
Consciousness, edited by Susan Schneider and Max Velmans, Wiley Blackwell, 2017,
pp. 63–72.
Andrews, Kristin. The Animal Mind: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Animal Cognition. 1st
ed., Routledge, 2014.
Bekoff, Marc. “Social Cognition: Exchanging and Sharing Information on the Run.” Erkenntnis
(1975-), vol. 51, no. 1, 1999, pp. 113–128. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/20012943.
Bekoff, Marc, and Sherman, Paul. “Reflections on Animal Selves.” Trends in Ecology &
Evolution, vol. 19, no. 4, 2004, pp. 176–80. Crossref, doi:10.1016/j.tree.2004.12.010.
Byom, Lindsey J., and Bilge Mutlu. “Theory of Mind: Mechanisms, Methods, and New
Directions.” Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, vol. 7, 2013. Crossref,
doi:10.3389/fnhum.2013.00413.
Cartmill, Matt. “Animal Consciousness: Some Philosophical, Methodological, and Evolutionary
Problems.” American Zoologist, vol. 40, no. 6, 2000, pp. 835–46. Crossref,
doi:10.1093/icb/40.6.835.
Darwin, Charles, Leonard Kebler, and Joseph Meredith Toner Collection. The Descent of Man:
And Selection in Relation to Sex. London: J. Murray, 1889.
DeGrazia, David. “Self-Awareness in Animals.” The Philosophy of Animal Minds, edited by
Robert W. Lurz, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009, pp. 201–217.

Bernewitz 67
Dennett, Daniel. “Animal Consciousness: What Matters and Why.” Social Research, vol. 62, no.
3, 1995, pp. 691–710. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/40971115.
Deonna J., Nanay B. (2014) “Simulation Versus Theory-Theory: A Plea for an Epistemological
Turn.” In: Reboul A. (eds) Mind, Values, and Metaphysics. Springer, Cham.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-05146-8_20
Erwin, D. H., et al. “The Cambrian Conundrum: Early Divergence and Later Ecological Success
in the Early History of Animals.” Science, vol. 334, no. 6059, 2011, pp. 1091–97.
Crossref, doi:10.1126/science.1206375.
Essler, Jennifer L et al. “Play Behavior in Wolves: Using the '50:50' Rule to Test for Egalitarian
Play Styles.” PloS one vol. 11,5 e0154150. 11 May. 2016,
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0154150
Frege, Gottlob. “Sense and Reference.” The Philosophical Review, vol. 57, no. 3, 1948,
pp. 209-230., www.jstor.org/stable/2181485.
Gallup, G.G. Can animals empathize? Yes. Sci. Am., 1998, 9, pp. 66 – 71
Gertler, Brie. Mind, vol. 107, no. 427, 1998, pp. 676–679. JSTOR,
www.jstor.org/stable/2660124
Graziano, Michael. Rethinking Consciousness: A Scientific Theory of Subjective Experience. 1st
ed., W. W. Norton & Company, 2019.
Griffin, Donald. Animal Minds. New Ed, University Of Chicago Press, 1994.
Godfrey-Smith, Peter. Other Minds: The Octopus, the Sea, and the Deep Origins of
Consciousness. Reprint, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2017.
Gómez, Juan Carlos. “Mutual Awareness in Primate Communication: A Gricean Approach.”
Self-Awareness in Animals and Humans, edited by Sue Taylor Parker et al., Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1994, pp. 61–80.

Bernewitz 68
Hardcastle, Valerie. “THE WHY OF CONSCIOUSNESS: A NON-ISSUE FOR MATERIALISTS.”
Journal of Consciousness Studies, 3, No.1, 1996, pp. 7-13

Hauber, Mark E., and Paul W. Sherman. “Self-Referent Phenotype Matching: Theoretical
Considerations and Empirical Evidence.” Trends in Neurosciences, vol. 24, no. 10, 2001,
pp. 609–16. Crossref, doi:10.1016/s0166-2236(00)01916-0.
Hejnol A, Rentzsch F. “Neural nets”. Curr Biol. 2015, Sep 21;25(18): R782-6.
doi:10.1016/j.cub.2015.08.001. PMID: 26394095.
"Indiscriminate." Merriam-Webster.com. 2011. https://www.merriam-webster.com.
Janik, Vincent M. “Play in Dolphins.” Current Biology, vol. 25, no. 1, 2015, pp. R7–8. Crossref,
doi:10.1016/j.cub.2014.09.010.
Janik, V. M., et al. “Signature Whistle Shape Conveys Identity Information to Bottlenose
Dolphins.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 103, no. 21, 2006, pp.
8293–97. Crossref, doi:10.1073/pnas.0509918103.
Kuczaj, S. A. II, Yeater, D., & Highfill, L. “How selective is social learning in dolphins?”
International Journal Of Comparative Psychology, 2012, 25(3), 221-236. Retrieved from
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/9z25m1rq
Leatherwood, Stephen, and Randall Reeves. The Bottlenose Dolphin. Elsevier, 1990.
Mandik, Pete. This Is Philosophy of Mind: An Introduction. 1st ed., Wiley-Blackwell, 2013.
Marchetti, Giorgio. “Consciousness: A Unique Way of Processing Information.” Cognitive
Processing, vol. 19, no. 3, 2018, pp. 435–64. Crossref, doi:10.1007/s10339-018-0855-8.
Mateo, Jill M. “Self-Referent Phenotype Matching and Long-Term Maintenance of Kin
Recognition.” Animal Behaviour, vol. 80, no. 5, 2010, pp. 929–35. Crossref,
doi:10.1016/j.anbehav.2010.08.019.

Bernewitz 69
Mateo, Jill M. “Recognition Systems and Biological Organization: The Perception Component of
Social Recognition.” Annales Zoologici Fennici, vol. 41, no. 6, 2004, pp. 729–745. JSTOR,
www.jstor.org/stable/23736140.
Millikan, Ruth. “Styles of Rationality.” In Rational Animals, ed Susan Hurley and Matthew
Nudds, 117-126. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.
Nagel, Thomas. “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” Philosophical Review, 1974, 83: 435-450.
Sakarya, Onur, et al. “A Post-Synaptic Scaffold at the Origin of the Animal Kingdom.” PLoS
ONE, edited by Leslie Vosshall, vol. 2, no. 6, 2007, p. e506. Crossref,
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0000506.
Smuts, Barbara. “Chapter 4 - Social Behaviour among Companion Dogs with an Emphasis on
Play” ed Juliane Kaminski, Sarah Marshall-Pescini, The Social Dog, Academic Press,
2014, pp 105-130, ISBN 9780124078185, https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-4078185.00004-8.
"Theories of Meaning", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2021 Edition),
Edward N. Zalta (ed.), <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2021/entries/meaning/>.
Tyack, P. L.“Development and social functions of signature mistles in bottlenose dolphins
Tursiops truncates.” Bioacoustics, 1997 8(1-2), 21–46
Vitti, Joseph. The Distribution and Evolution of Animal Consciousness. Havard University,
2010.
Von Frisch, Karl. The Dance Language and Orientation of Bees. 1st edition, Harvard University
Press, 1976.

